In the process of European constitutionalisation, the European Union continues to struggle for an identity that can generate widespread support amongst its peoples. Against this background it has been suggested by some that a European identity should embrace the Christian values that underpin Europe's national traditions and cultures. In this paper I shall argue that, instead of relying on a communitarian vision of a 'Christian Europe', a European identity should build on a culture of religious tolerance. A European culture of religious tolerance draws on the enduring of difference and the acknowledgement of persisting and intractable conflict as essential experiences of Europe's Christian past. Thus understood, tolerance lies at the roots of a European identity. At the same time, and through the conditional inclusion of religious diversity in the European Nation-States, a European culture of religious tolerance creates over time new commonalities between Europe's religiously permeated national traditions. Thus understood, tolerance only brings about the conditions for the development of a supranational European identity that amounts to more than (the sum of) its national counterparts.
Introduction
When John Locke wrote his Epistola de Tolerantia in post-Reformation Europe he did not stress the value of religious diversity, nor did he defend religious homogeneity as a necessary backbone for social unity and political legitimacy. Whereas the former must have seemed quite inconceivable to him, the latter was precisely the object of his critique. Locke was committed to the ideal of a religious society deeply rooted in Christian beliefs and values; yet he also realized that in the face of intractably conflicting beliefs over the true path to salvation, any attempt to bring about such a society other than through 'light and evidence' would prove fatal: "it is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal * of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon account of religion" (Locke,1991:52) . This is a rather defensive claim that may not satisfy those who, four centuries later, have rediscovered Europe's Christian heritage as a potential engine for future European integration. In an era where functional integration has reached its limits, where a national ethos or a European demos is unavailable, and a European public sphere of collective will-formation remains out of sight, the conjuration of a common Christian culture and tradition could, or so it is hoped by some, (re)gain citizens' solidarity for the European project. Thus, or so the argument goes, a European identity should build on the Christian values that underpin Europe's national traditions and cultures. Moreover, the shared commitment to uphold and foster these values should provide a sufficiently thick value-basis to unite the European family of nations.
To be plausible, a genealogy of European identity must be about continuity and transformation: it must commemorate Europe's Christian past and imagine it, in a transformative way, as a common basis for Europe's future. Moreover, it must be about unity and diversity: it must explain the self-constituting of the peoples of Europe in a supranational European order that respects Europe's diverse national traditions and cultures. Against this background, I shall defend the Lockean view and argue that rather than on a communitarian vision of a Christian Europe, a European identity should build on a culture of religious tolerance. Tolerance, the mere 'putting up' with religious diversity, embodies an ambivalent value; as Derrida put it, tolerance "says to the other from its elevated position, I am letting you be, you are not insufferable, I am leaving you a place in my home, but do not forget that this is my home…" (Derrida, 2003:127-28) . It is embedded in an area of tension between straightforward rejection and full-hearted acceptance of minoritarian religious worldviews:
while preferable to religious exclusion, it appears too negative an engagement with difference when compared to the equal inclusion of religious diversity. I submit that, paradoxically, religious tolerance thus lies at the roots of a European identity and only creates the conditions for its very development. At the outset, I briefly discuss John Locke's defence of religious tolerance in the context of 17 th century Christian Europe. I contend that the European societies' capacity to defuse the social destructiveness of religious conflict and to develop an institutional framework for the peaceful coexistence of conflicting religious worldviews is one of the most precious inheritances of the European Enlightenment. It was not a homogeneous
Christian culture but an experience of religious conflict and the concomitant development of a culture of religious tolerance that created the conditions for political unity in the early-modern Christian state. Moreover, it was not the attempt to implement religious uniformity but the tolerance of religious diversity that lead to a more appreciative relationship between the Christian denominations in the European Nation-States. In a second step I consider the role of religious tolerance in the European Nation-States, taking the 'headscarf debates' in Germany 
The European heritage of religious tolerance
Religious tolerance played an important role in the social and political conflicts that divided European societies along religious lines in the 16 th and 17 th centuries. The civil wars that swept Europe from 1530 to the 1690s were not simply struggles for political power, but also religious conflicts. Religious tolerance initially developed in a context where religious homogeneity was considered indispensable for both social stability and political legitimacy:
ecclesiam et imperium esse unum et idem (Lecler, 1965:137) . Christian believers and churches encountered each other on the basis of their conflicting claims to religious truth that a priori excluded any kind of political compromise. At the same time, religious questions were politicised in their entirety, and any form of religious diversity therefore threatened the political authority of the early modern state. Hence, the decision to have an established church was not merely a question of implementing religious dogma; it was also, importantly, a matter of political stability (Böckenförde, 1991:36-7) . And while it was generally assumed that the king should suppress false beliefs, pragmatic considerations led at times to concessions of tolerance as the second-best solution where the enforcement of religious uniformity seemed, for the time being, unachievable. Accordingly, rather than asserting a general right to freedom of religion, tolerance only granted conditional and limited exceptions from the requirement of religious uniformity.
It is against this background that 17 th century Protestant thinkers like John Locke (1632-1704) aimed for a more principled justification of religious tolerance. As early as in the Two Tracts on Government (1660), Locke argued that religion had become a major source of civil unrest because Christian leaders and 'the clergy of all sects' had inculcated two erroneous beliefs in both 'princes' and the 'laity': first, that it was a Christian duty to uphold and spread the true way to heaven and, secondly, that this was to be done by force and compulsion. Given the multiplicity of Christian faiths, each of which considered itself orthodox, these beliefs necessarily culminated in the persecution by the government and religious revolts by the people:
Hence have the cunning and malice of men taken occasion to pervert the doctrine of peace and charity into a perpetual foundation of war and contention, all those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with coals from the altar, and too much blown with the breath of those that attend the altar, who, forgetting their calling which is to promote peace and meekness (Locke, 1967:160-61 ).
Locke's response in the Epistola de Tolerantia consists of stressing the Christian duty of charity and the social destructiveness of religious persecution. Regarding the former, he emphasises two core moral beliefs as commanded in the Scripture: that God allows each man to worship in the way he sincerely believes to be right and that Christianity should be upheld by love and persuasion (Tully, 1990:15) . Regarding the latter, Locke argues that because nothing but the essentials of the revelation can be known with certainty, religious diversity is unavoidable and religious differences will prove intractable. Moreover, because "it is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties", the state cannot enforce religious uniformity (Locke, 1991:19) . Hence, religious persecution is not merely morally wrong because it contradicts the two fundamental Christian beliefs but furthermore irrational in that it cannot succeed in its stated objectives. Under such conditions, Locke concludes, "it is not the diversity of opinion, which cannot be avoided, but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion" (Locke, 1991:52 ).
Locke's argument against religious persecution issues in a (formal) separation of state and church, grounded in a (material) distinction between "the business of civil government"
and "the business of religion". The separation of state and church rests on a now familiar conception of 'formal' or 'reason-based' equality: religious considerations cannot justify political action because the commonwealth is "a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests" and "the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments" (Locke, 1991:17) . The difficulties with such formal equality models are equally familiar, namely that they are not sufficiently sensitive to the consequences of state action. Locke maintains,
[if] such were the state of things, that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle, that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain; who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed, that in this case the law is not made about religion, but about political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves thereby prohibited (Locke, 1991:37) .
However, while the farmer who cannot kill his calf until the stock has been sufficiently increased will merely suffer a temporal economic disadvantage, the religious believer, when not engaging in the rituals required by her faith, will risk her salvation. And it is difficult to see why Locke's proposal should seem equally congenial to both of them. This dilemma points to a yet deeper problem with Locke's argument that concerns his material distinction between 'the business of civil government' and 'the business of religion', or between laws made about a 'political matter' and laws made about 'religion'. The boundaries between state and church, Locke maintains, are "fixed and immoveable" because both are "in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other" (Locke, 1991:26) :
It is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed, and by what measures regulated, and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of society. … And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is, that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends his eternal happiness (Locke, 1991:44 ).
Yet this did not prevent Locke from rubberstamping the use of force against certain doctrines because they constituted, by their very nature, a threat to the civil order of the Commonwealth. This is most obvious in Locke's categorical refusal to tolerate atheists:
"Lastly, Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking-away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves everything" (Locke, 1991:47) . It must have been clear to Locke that advocacy of intolerance against atheists was incompatible with his premise about the involuntary nature of religious belief insomuch as the atheist, too, could not simply take up a religious belief by will (Dunn, 1991:179) . However, Locke can consistently maintain that people should not be persecuted for their religious (non-) beliefs but on the basis that what they believe amounts to a threat to public order. For Locke, the existence of God and the natural law was a demonstrable truth that lies at the very foundation of morality, indispensable for good government and individual conduct: while the belief in
God sustains moral values, the fear of divine punishment restrains rulers from abusing their powers and individual subjects from sedition (Tully, 1993:54 can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. … It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in religion, but in every thing else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of Constantinople; who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman emperor … (Locke, 1991:46-7) .
To the extent that the Lockean state is grounded in religious tolerance, it is released from the unconditional nature of obligations to religious truth and becomes subject to the contingencies of politics directed towards the public good. Considered this way, it was the tolerance of religious diversity, rather than the attempt to implement religious homogeneity, that created the conditions for a political unity in the early-modern European states. At the same time, however, Locke's defence of religious tolerance was still embedded in an overarching Christian framework. His notion of state and society remain, as John Dunn has maintained, "shaped and dominated by a picture of the earthly setting of human life as a created order, an order designed and controlled by an omnipotent, omniscient and also, mercifully, benevolent deity: the God of the Christians" (Dunn, 1990:11) . And in such a world there was no place for atheists, 'Mahometans' and other sects that had arrived at "such a degree of madness, as that [they] should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the judgement of all mankind" (Locke, 1967:45) . Hence, religious tolerance in postReformation Europe embodied an ambivalent value. It was embedded in an area of tension between the full-hearted acceptance and the straightforward rejection of minoritarian religious worldviews. On the one hand, rather than guaranteeing a general right to freedom of religion, tolerance merely granted conditional and limited concessions of public worship to some of the Christian denominations. And rather than accepting the other as an equal moral partner, it merely required an act of non-reciprocal indulgence towards those considered to be inferior and categorically wrong. Yet on the other hand, tolerance helped to defuse the social destructiveness of religious conflict in early modern Europe. By contesting the justification of religious persecution from religious truth it offered, however, a volatile and imperfect protection against religiously motivated discrimination. By granting conditional and limited exceptions to the norm of religious uniformity, it challenged the association of social and political stability with religious homogeneity and therefore paved the way towards the liberal transformation of the European states. Against this background, then, rather than conjuring a shared Christian culture, a European identity should commemorate the way European
Christians have learnt to stabilize the tensions between their conflicting worldviews and to live together in difference. After all, the development of a culture of religious tolerance only created the conditions under which it became possible to discern commonalities between the Christian denominations in the European Nation-States.
National traditions and Christian culture
The liberal transformation of the European moral and legal-political orders took place The Right and the Left can define the prohibition on Islamic headscarves in the classroom as a defence of either French Christian or French secular culture, because the two are not at all mutually exclusive. Current Western Christian religious practice defines that women and men bare their heads in public, non-sacred buildings, and that convention -the absence of a religious marker -has been accepted as a secular practise. But the absence is also a marker, and for other religious traditions with other religious practices, going bareheaded may be seen as an overtly Christian practice, or at the least one in weak disguise, especially if that practice is legislated in a dominantly Christian country (Moruzzi, 1994:664) .
The laic interpretation of liberal neutrality proves less neutral than it purports because it privileges, in effect or intention, a secularized Christian culture and tradition. While, as
Modood puts it, "for some people, religion is about 'the inner life', or personal conduct or individual salvation [and] for others, it includes communal obligations, a public philosophy and political action … radical secular political arrangements seem to suit and favour the private kind of religions, but not those that require public action. It is surely a contradiction to require both that the state be neutral about religion and that the state should require religions with public ambitions to give them up". (1998:393) In short, European Christians will find it much easier to accept the liberal public-private divide with its privatization of religious faith than other religious communities simply because they contributed to its creation in the first place. More importantly, this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to formal (reason-based) neutrality because this still leaves open the crucial question as to whether religions should be treated equally in a negative sense (equally restrictive) or in a positive sense (equally unrestrictive). As it has become apparent in the Lockean paradigm, a formal separation of state and church and the exclusion of religious justifications of state action do not suffice to define the place of religion in relation to the 'public good'. As a consequence, and similarly to the German model, the inclusion of religious minorities in the French state is no longer conditional on their religious convictions but on their assimilation to a French national identity that remains infused with Christian values.
With the transition to liberalism, state neutrality and freedom of religion formally forestall discrimination on grounds of religious belief. The liberal state does not merely tolerate its citizens' religious convictions but purports to treat them equally. However, insomuch as liberal neutrality does not require the state to be neutral between absolutely everything, it remains a normatively dependent concept that needs to be interpreted in the light of some non-neutral background assumptions. In the European Nation-States, liberal neutrality is substantiated against the background of national identities that continue to appeal
to Christian values as they have shaped their distinctive interpretations of nationhood. Thus both religious-communitarian and secular-laic models privilege, albeit in different ways, a
Christian culture as it evolved out of the interplay between religion and secularisation. This has two main consequences: first, and within the Nation-States, the realm of tolerance is 
European supranationalism and religious tolerance
The peoples of Europe, or so it is maintained in the Preamble of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, "while remaining proud of their own national identities and history … are determined to transcend their former divisions and united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny". In this spirit, a European identity must be about continuity and transformation: it must commemorate Europe's conflictive Christian past, but it must also transcend this past in view of creating a common European future. Moreover, a
European identity must be about unity and diversity: it must respect Europe's diverse religiously permeated national traditions, but it must also succeed in defining its own distinctive culture capable of holding out against them. Continuity and transformation, unity rejected the boundary abuse of the nation-state gave birth to a polity with the same potential for abuse" (Weiler, 1999:341 ). Weiler's ideal of a supranational European polity, by contrast, dwells on the notion of a "community as a transnational regime" that is "not meant to eliminate the national state but to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline" (Weiler, 1999:251) . Thus supranationalism does not seek to "redraw the actual political boundaries of the polity within the existing nation-state conceptual framework" but to "redefine the very notion of boundaries of the state, between the nation and the state, and within the nation itself" (Weiler, 1999: 250) . Similarly to the transition from the Christian to the national state that partly dissolved the linkage between the state and religion in favour of a new linkage between the state and a merely religiously permeated nation, the relationship between the national and the supranational is not one of mutual exclusiveness.
Rather, it denotes a process of continuous transformation that partly disentangles the state from the nation, yet retains elements of Europe's national traditions and cultures. In contrast to the former, this continuous transformation no longer rests on an exclusive unity between the state and its people but on a plurality of intersecting national and supranational orders. A European culture of religious tolerance is well-equipped to meet the challenges posed by a supranational identity that assumes a European unity in national diversity. In the European "it is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided, but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon account of religion".
